An act of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, approved by 28 Us.C 2241 (c) (5), is not a “detainee” within the meaning of the law and does not trigger the application of the agreement. However, when an inmate has been filed, the use of a letter of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to obtain custody of the children constitutes a “written application” within the meaning of the agreement that activates its provisions. See UNITED States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978). The application of the agreement is also not triggered by a letter of habeas corpus ad testificandum, at least if no charges are pending against the prisoner in the jurisdiction of the exhibition. See Carmona v. Warden, 549 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
The courts do not agree on whether the anti-shuttling provisions of the agreement are violated by a short period of detention of less than one day that will not interrupt the prisoner`s rehabilitation programme. United States vs. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 635-636 (7th Cir. 1987); Sassoon v. Stynchcombe, 654 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1981). Similarly, the return of a federal accused to a public institution where he or she will be held under contract as a federal inmate should not be contrary to the “anti-shuttling” provisions. See UNITED States v.
Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227, 229 n. 3 (bench), cert. United States vs. Thompson, 562 F.2d 232, 234 (3. Cir. 1977) (on bench), cert. However, given the heavy penalties imposed for non-compliance with anti-shuttling provisions, one should be extremely careful before deviating in any way from the strict dictates of Article IV, point e), and Section 9 of the agreement. The agreement also provides that, when a prisoner seeks an injunction for a case for which an inmate has been filed, he applies for an order on all matters for which the detainees have been submitted by the same “[S]tate”.
Article III, point (d). In this context, the various federal districts have been referred to as separate “[S]tates. See UNITED States v. Bryant, 612 F.2d 806 (4. Cir. 1979), cert. The agreement does not authorize prosecutions for other charges for which no detainee has been detained unless they arise from the same transaction. [Article V, point d) ] It is not clear whether the trial of the latter is mandatory. Transfer of prisoners: anti-shuttling provisions: Article III, (d) and Article IV, point (e), contain similar provisions which require that: “If the trial is not brought on a charge, information or complaint contemplated prior to the prisoner`s return to the place of initial detention, that charge, information or complaint must have no force or effect, and the court makes a decision the United States is not the jurisdiction of receipt and disclosure and the possibility of being heard in accordance with the Section 9 of the agreement. [Article IV, point e) ] It was found that the “trial” included a conviction in this context. See Walker v. King, 448 F.
Supp. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The department did not accept this decision as a correct interpretation of the law. However, in order to avoid litigation and the risk of reversal of proceedings, the return of prisoners should be postponed to the period following the imposition of the sentence or a section 9 hearing.